When organizations face the coexistence of multiple institutional logics for environmental management (e.g., maximizing market profit, protecting the environment), how do firms configure green human resource management (GHRM) practices to achieve sustainability in both environmental and market domains? Leveraging the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) technique, this study adopts a configurational approach to analyze the complex interdependence of GHRM practices with the underlying institutional logics for achieving firm sustainable performance. Employing a multi-source matched sample of 179 firms, the findings reveal (...) the existence of multiple configurations of institutional logics and GHRM practices that equally result in high environmental performance, market performance, or both. The analysis also identifies that firms vary in their selection between environment protection and market profit logics, and the need to match different control- or commitment-based GHRM practices to achieve high environmental and market performance. (shrink)

This study examined how servant leadership influences employees in terms of work-to-family conflict and work-to-family positive spillover. These effects were explored through a focus on the mediating roles of emotional exhaustion and personal learning. The results, which were based on time-lagged data collection in China, indicated that employee perceptions of servant leadership related negatively to WFC and positively to WFPS. Moreover, reduced emotional exhaustion and enhanced personal learning mediated the relationship between servant leadership and WFPS. Furthermore, reduced emotional exhaustion mediated (...) the relationship between servant leadership and WFC. Our study’s results provide insightful theoretical and managerial implications and offer new directions for research on leadership and work–family relations. (shrink)

As it has become more and more urgent to solve the problems of environmental protection, we consider it necessary to conduct multilevel studies to examine the impact of business strategy on both employees’ and firms’ performances in environmental protection. Synthesizing the perspectives of strategic orientation, corporate strategy, and firm performance, we propose a comprehensive theoretical model linking market orientation and environmental performance. Based on a survey of 134 matched chief executive officers, senior marketing managers and frontline workers from Chinese firms, (...) we found that market orientation positively affects environmental strategy which, in turn, influences both environmental product quality and employees’ environmental involvement. These latter two variables consequently have a positive influence on environmental performance. At the same time, environmental commitment moderates the link between market orientation and environmental strategy. (shrink)

This volume addresses the study of family law and society in Europe, from medieval to contemporary ages. It examines the topic from a legal and social point of view. Furthermore, it investigates those aspects of the new family legal history that have not commonly been examined in depth by legal historians. The volume provides a new 'global' interpretative key of the development of family law in Europe. It presents essays about family and the Christian influence, family and criminal law, family (...) and civil liability, filiation (legitimate, natural and adopted children), and family and children labour law. In addition, it explores specific topics related to marriage, such as the matrimonial property regime from a European comparative perspective, and impediments to marriage, such as bigamy. The book also addresses topics including family, society and European juridical science. (shrink)

本书讲述了如:操纵人心、恭敬待人、出人头地、收揽人心等历史上为人处世,安邦治国的技巧和实例。.

On doctrine and concept of doubt in Indian philosophy; seminar papers.

Criminal attempts require intent to commit an offence. But what constitutes such intent? Some cases are fairly straightforward. I act with intent to convert stolen goods if I intend that the goods I purchase be stolen. A man acts with intent to commit rape if he intends that the sexual intercourse be non-consensual. Other cases leave room for reasonable disagreement. Did a man intend to convert criminal property when he purchased goods which he suspected might be stolen? And did a (...) man intend to rape a woman when he tried to have intercourse with her and was reckless about consent? Does recklessness as to the circumstance elements of an offence suffice for intent? Building on the view that attempts are failed attacks (as opposed to acts of endangerment), I argue that recklessness about circumstances is not enough for intent since such recklessness amounts to an act of endangerment. This is not to suggest that a man does nothing wrong in trying to have sex with a woman while being reckless about consent; it is to argue that he should be convicted of an endangerment offence, rather than an attempt. If we take seriously the idea that attempts are failed attacks, and that attacks and endangerments constitute different types of moral wrong, we have good reason to preserve this distinction in our offence labels by insisting that the fault element for attempts should require at least knowledge or belief as to the relevant circumstances of an offence. (shrink)

Commentary on the Guṇa section of Udayanācārya's Kiraṇāvali, treatise on Vaíśeṣika philosophy.

Recognition of the identity of familiar faces in conditions with poor visibility or over large changes in head angle, lighting and partial occlusion is far more accurate than recognition of unfamiliar faces in similar conditions. Here we used a visual search paradigm to test if one class of social cues transmitted by faces – direction of another’s attention as conveyed by gaze direction and head orientation – is perceived more rapidly in personally familiar faces than in unfamiliar faces. We found (...) a strong effect of familiarity on the detection of these social cues, suggesting that the times to process these signals in familiar faces are markedly faster than the corresponding processing times for unfamiliar faces. In the light of these new data, hypotheses on the organization of the visual system for processing faces are formulated and discussed. (shrink)

This thesis examines some of the legal philosophical issues that are implicated in the problem of outcome luck. In the context of criminal law, the problem asks whether we should hold agents criminally liable for the consequences of their actions given that those consequences are never wholly within anyone’s control. I conclude that outcomes should matter to an agent’s liability and punishment, and I make this argument indirectly by examining some of the foundational questions in legal theory. The thesis begins (...) by considering a current trend in some areas of philosophy. This trend involves attempts to address philosophical problems surrounding luck by doing conceptual analyses on the nature of luck. Chapter 1 critically examines modal theories, which conceptualize luck, as well as the related concept of risk, in terms of close possible worlds rather than probabilistic likelihood. I argue that not only are modal theories uninformative, but conceptual analyses on luck are unhelpful in addressing philosophical questions surrounding luck. Chapter 2 then returns to the traditional notion of luck as lack of control, and focuses on the relationship between luck, risk, and culpability. Some theorists argue that culpability, for any offence, is in part a function of the degree of risk the agent imposes on others. In the context of criminal law, degrees of luck and risk can both be understood in terms of degrees of control, so the suggestion that culpability is a function of the level of risk imposed (and thus of the degree of control an agent exercises) is attractive for insulating culpability judgments from luck. However, I argue that this view is mistaken because culpability is only sensitive to risk in reckless actions, but not in purposeful actions. The problem of outcome luck may raise different questions for reckless actions and purposeful actions. Chapter 3 looks at the mens rea element of criminal attempts, which is crucial for understanding the problem of luck in the context of purposeful actions. I discuss a variation of what are sometimes referred to as impossible attempts, which have helped shape current English law. I argue that the current doctrine is largely correct, and that perhaps with the exception of few paradigm sexual offences, the mens rea element for attempts should require a direct intention as to the consequence element of an offence, and knowledge or belief as to the circumstance element of that offence. Chapters 4 and 5 then look at normative justifications of criminal punishment. In order to understand whether outcomes should matter for punishment, we must first understand whether and why punishment is an appropriate response to criminal offending. Here, I defend a communicative theory, where punishment is a communicative process between the offender, the political community, and the victim. What punishment communicates is the appropriate degree of censure that is warranted in response to the offender’s wrongdoing. And in doing this, it publicly recognizes the wrong that has been committed by the offender. Chapter 4 offers a detailed explanation of this account, and argues that the political community’s recognition of wrongdoing is a valuable aim of communication. Chapter 5 then takes up a crucial challenge against communicative theories of punishment, which is that such theories fail to take crime prevention seriously. Against this criticism, I will show that general prevention can in fact be an essential part of communicative punishment. And I will show that it is specifically the political community’s recognition of wrongdoing that entails punishment’s preventive aims. (shrink)

This research investigates whether required employee green behavior can spill over to a proactive form of green behavior termed green advocacy. Drawing on self-perception theory, we theorize and test a moderated mediation model in which required employee green behavior is positively associated with green advocacy via the mediation of pro-environmental self-identity, with the strength of such association contingent upon employee moral identity. Data collected in three waves from 297 employees at a large manufacturing firm in China provide support for the (...) research model. Results show that pro-environmental self-identity explains the positive association between required employee green behavior and green advocacy and that its mediating role is stronger when moral identity is higher (vs. lower). This study advances workplace green behavior research by identifying a novel psychological path and extending knowledge about a boundary condition. (shrink)

Originally published in Italian in 1976, this book describes the methods scientists use to investigate the physical world. It is ideal for students and teachers of science and the philosophy of science. It is both a high-level popularization and a critical appraisal of these methods, describing important advances in physics and analyzing the historical development, value, reliability and philosophical implications of the way physicists approach the problems confronting them. The introductory chapter on the meaning of physical theories and the mathematical (...) tools used to develop them is followed by a general discussion on the foundations of physics under four major headings: the physics of the reversible, the physics of the irreversible, microphysics, and cosmology. Throughout, the subject matter of physical theories is linked to discussion of the attendant philosophical and epistemological implications, such as the validity of the theories, inductive inference, causal explanation, probability, the role of observation and the reality of physical objects. (shrink)

Since the beginning of the 21st century, soft skills have long been advocated in education. However, the interpretations of soft skills are heterogeneous, and the relevant educational interventions...

Normative notions are central to Husserl’s account of intentionality: intending an object is a normative achievement, essentially admitting of fulfillment or disappointment. So is teleology: intentional conscious life is inseparable from a horizontal orientation toward “ideas in the Kantian sense.” How are they related? Is teleology essential for intentionality as a normative achievement? Or, in Husserl’s way of putting it, do relative truths “demand” ideal truths? This article explores some reasons for agreeing with Husserl that this is indeed the case. (...) In Sec. 2, I will identify a “normative turn” in Husserl’s account of the basic structure of perceptual intentionality and spell out the teleological character of this normative account. This sense of teleology is a minimal one. A more robust teleology, in the sense of an orientation toward infinite ideality, is then justified in Sec. 3 by virtue of its function in the constitution of genuine objectivity. In Sec. 4, I will turn to the noetic, especially the ego-oriented side of Husserl’s analysis, in order to clarify the normative force of infinite telos. All in all, I will argue that the normative and the teleological sides of the story are inextricably intertwined in Husserl’s account of intentional conscious life. (shrink)

There is an eminent tradition of thought that sees in the phenomenon of time something contradictory. This tradition has been recently revived by some contemporary proponents of dialethism – the view that there are true contradictions. In this paper, I will contribute to this line of thinking by tracing the first steps of a dialethic account of time-consciousness. In particular, I will argue that the experiential flow of time can be accounted for in the framework of an intentionalist approach to (...) temporal perception if we conceive of time-consciousness as a quasi-multiplicity, i.e., a multiplicity of non-self-identical parts, hence the embrace of dialethism. Section 1 introduces dialethism, discusses Priest's dialethic theory of motion and time, and motivates the project of a dialethic account of time-consciousness. Section 2 introduces the intentionalist approach to time-consciousness and distinguishes pure intentionalism from sense-data intentionalism; both subscribes to a certain Principle of Simultaneous Awareness but interprets it differently. In Sect. 3, I offer an in-depth analysis of this principle and identify its core as the requirement of self-unification, i.e., the requirement that time-consciousness unifies itself in flowing without any higher-order act of unification. Section 4 then argues that pure intentionalism can satisfy this requirement by embracing dialethism. I conclude by noting how the dialethic account of time-consciousness incorporates a central extensionalist insight within an intentionalist outlook. (shrink)

A proposal for the biological grounding of intrinsic teleology and sense-making through the theory of autopoiesis is critically evaluated. Autopoiesis provides a systemic lan- guage for speaking about intrinsic teleology but its original formulation needs to be elaborated further in order to explain sense-making. This is done by introducing adaptivity, a many-layered property that allows organisms to regulate themselves with respect to their conditions of via- bility. Adaptivity leads to more articulated concepts of behaviour, agency, sense-construction, health, and temporality than (...) those given so far by autopoiesis and enaction. These and other implications for understanding the organismic generation of values are explored. (shrink)

In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities according to which if in the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. And because what happens in the counterfactual scenario cannot count as the relevant agent's actions given the sort of external control that agent is under, then we can ground responsibility on that agent having been able to avoid acting. (...) I illustrate how this objection to Frankfurt's famous counterexample is motivated by Frankfurt's own 'guidance' view of agency. My argument consists in showing that even if we concede that the agent does not act in the counterfactual scenario, that does not show that the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. This depends on the crucial distinction between 'not φ-ing' and 'avoiding φ-ing'. (shrink)

According to the Simple View of intentional action, I have intentionally switched on the light only if I intended to switch on the light. The idea that intending to is necessary for intentionally -ing has been challenged by Bratman (1984, 1987) with a counter-example in which a videogame player is trying to hit either of two targets while knowing that she cannot hit both targets. When a target is hit, the game finishes. And if both targets are about to be (...) hit simultaneously, the game shuts down. The player knows that she cannot hit both targets, but still she concludes that, given her skills, the best strategy is to have a go at each target at the same time. Suppose she hits target 1. It seems obvious that she has hit target 1 intentionally. But, Bratman argues, she could not have intended to hit target 1. Since the scenario is perfectly symmetrical, had the player intended to hit target 1, she would have also had to intend to hit target 2. But the player knows that she cannot hit both targets. (shrink)